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Abstract. The main aim of this study is to explain how institutional change, based on 
processes of democratization, governs the origin and diffusion of technological innovation 
across economies. This study suggests that institutional change, based on a progressive 
democratization of countries, is a driving force of inventions and adoption of usable 
innovations in society. Policy makers, considering the positive associations between 
institutional change, based on a process of democratization, and paths of technological 
innovation, can propose best practices directed to support a higher economic freedom in 
society, effective regulation, higher economic and political stability, good economic 
governance and higher level of education system. Overall, then, institutional change, based 
on democratization, is a precondition for sustaining fruitful paths of technological 
innovation to govern the development of economies in the presence of globalization and 
geographical expansion in world economic system. 
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1. Introduction 
ocial scholars argue that the development of human societies over the 
long term is due to technological change or institutions that enable 
the definition and defense of formal property rights (Auerswald & 
Stefanotti, 2013; Coccia, 2010, 2019, 2019c, 2019i). However, the interaction 
between these two concepts is hardly known. Chlebna & Simmie (2018) 
claim that while there is agreement among scholars on the importance of 
institutions with respect to economic and industrial development, there 
remains little analysis on how and why institutions interact with 
technological change on which industrial development of advanced and 
emerging economies is based. The main aim of this chapter is to explain, 
whenever possible, the relation between institutional change, based on a 
process of democratization, and the patterns of technological innovation 
across countries. A theoretical background of the concepts of institutions 
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and institutional change is useful to understand and clarify this vital 
relation that can explain the paths of development in society.  
Institutional theory explains both individual and organizational actions. 
A main research field of institutional theory is the analysis of how 
institutions change over time (Campbell, 2004; Dacin et al., 2002; Di Maggio 
et al., 1991; Williamson, 2000). First of all, a debate revolves around how to 
conceptualize institutions and institutional change (Roland, 2004). The 
literature suggests different definitions of institution, which affect the 
perspective to study institutional change in society (cf., Alston, 1996; 
Coccia, 2019; Kingston & Caballero, 2009; Hodgson, 2006; Milgrom et al., 
1990). Veblen (1899, p.190) argues that institutions are: “prevalent habits of 
thought with respect to particular relations and particular functions of the 
individual and of the community” (cf., Brette, 2003). Hayek (1973) 
considers institutions based on shared expectations in society, rather than 
rules. North (1990; 2005) states that institutions: “are the rules of the game 
in a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction <. reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to 
everyday life”. Auerswald & Stefanotti (2013, p.113) state that institutions 
in general, and property rights in particular, are crucial to the functioning 
of credit markets that in turn are a key to economy-wide growth (cf., Coase, 
1960; Demsetz, 1967). In general, institutions are based on formal rules 
(such as laws and constitutions) and informal constraints (such as, 
conventions and norms). Instead, Aoki (2001, 2007) defines institutions as 
stable and shared systems of beliefs about the expected behavior of the 
members of a society in various contingencies. Greif (2006, p.30) adopts a 
broad definition of institution considering: “a system of rules, beliefs, 
norms and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) 
behavior”. In brief, North (1990) sees institutions as rules, whereas Aoki 
(2007, p.6) views institutions as “selfsustaining, salient patterns of social 
interactions” that give rise to “common knowledge among the players 
regarding a particular equilibrium path of the game”.  
The literature also proposes different theoretical frameworks of 
institutional change (cf., Coccia, 2019; Kingston & Caballero, 2009). In 
North’s approach, institutional change is an accumulation of incremental 
changes rather than occasional, radical changes. Libecap (1989) claims that 
institutional change is a path-dependent process in which institutions are a 
function of current technologies, but also of previous technologies and 
institutions. The institutional change is also a path-dependent process 
because individuals learn, organizations develop, and ideologies form in 
the context of formal and informal rules (Murat & Jared, 2017). Ostrom 
(2005) recognizes both exogenous causes of institutional change (e.g., 
technological change) and endogenous causes (e.g., the depletion of a 
resource over time). In particular, Ostrom (2005) distinguishes between 
“operational rules”, which govern day-to-day interactions, “collective 
choice rules” (rules for choosing operational rules), and “constitutional 
rules” (rules for choosing collective-choice rules), whereas “meta 
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constitutional rules” are for choosing constitutional rules (e.g., the “rules” 
by which a civil war is fought). Moreover, each individual calculates the 
expected costs and benefits of a given institutional change and, if a 
“minimum coalition” necessary to effect that change agrees to it, an 
institutional change can occur. Therefore, Libecap (1989) and Ostrom (2005) 
argue that an institutional change depends on higher-level rules and on 
how decision makers perceive the likely effects of a change in rules. 
Scholars also analyze institutional change as an evolutionary process (cf., 
Kingston & Caballero, 2009; Coccia, 2018, 2018c, 2019, 2019h). Theories of 
evolutionary institutional change suggest that institutional change is due to 
human actions, such as learning, imitation, etc. The difference between 
evolutionary and designed-based theories of institutional change lies in the 
role of selection processes determining which rules emerge and adapt in 
socioeconomic environments (Coccia, 2019; cf., Coccia, 2017e). In particular, 
evolutionary theories do not consider a central mechanism (e.g., legislation) 
that affects interactions of people in society.  
The interaction between institutional change and patterns of 
technological innovation has been analyzed with different perspectives 
(Coccia, 2019). Ayres (1944, p.187) considers exogenous technological 
progress as the main driver of institutional change: “technological 
development forces change upon the institutional structure by changing 
the material setting in which it operates”. Nelson (2005, p.169) sees changes 
in physical technology as a source of institutional change. In general, 
technological evolution can be a determinant of institutional change in 
society (Coccia, 2018a; Coccia, 2019a, b; Coccia & Watts, 2020; Perez, 2004), 
though the relationship can be bi-directional, with interrelationships 
between technological change and institutional change (Coccia, 2010, 2014, 
2014a, 2018, 2019, 2019a, b, c, d, e). In particular, institutions can affect 
technology generating an interaction, so that “it probably is useful to think 
of physical and social technologies as coevolving” (Nelson, 2005; cf., 
Coccia, 2010, 2014, 2018b, 2019, 2019a, 2019b, 2016c; Coccia & Watts, 2020). 
Overall, then, economists and policymakers have increasingly 
recognized the role played by institutions and institutional change in the 
process of economic and technological development (Coccia, 2019; cf., 
Coccia, 2019i). This contribution now moves on to discuss the relationships 
between institutional change, based on a process of democratization, and 
innovative outputs across countries, trying, as far as possible, to clarify 
these topics that are important, very important for supporting the economic 
growth of countries.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
Literature shows different perspectives to investigate the role of 
institutions for technological change (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Nelson 
(1993) considers institutions as the legislation and organization of 
education and training that differ at national level, and therefore form the 
basis of distinctive national systems of innovation. Edquist & Johnson 
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(1997) define institutions as behavioral patterns such as routines, norms, 
shared expectations and morals. Lundvall & Maskell (2000) argue that 
institutions develop from and co-evolve with solving specific problems 
through processes of interactive learning (cf., Bathelt & Glückler, 2014; 
Coccia, 2016). Chlebna & Simmie (2018) observe that technical change 
requires complementary institutional change and that new technologies 
may not be supported by existing institutional arrangements (Freeman & 
Perez, 2008; Nelson, 1998). As a result, for major innovation to succeed 
“institutional and regulatory changes must take place” (Rip & Kemp, 1998, 
p.364). North (1990) argues that the concept of path dependence can be 
applied to both technological and institutional change. In fact, Setterfield 
(1993, p.761) also suggests that institutions can evolve with path-dependent 
phenomena. In general, institutions and institutional change play a 
significant role among the various forces of economies underlying the 
development of technological trajectories. Chlebna & Simmie (2018, p. 973) 
argue that some agents possess or develop the capacity to stimulate 
institutional change. In this context, Garud et al., (2007) identify the 
institutional entrepreneurs that have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
transform existing ones. Socioeconomic movements can also play a key role 
as collective agents of institutional change (Doblinger & Soppe, 2013; Vasi, 
2011). Chlebna & Simmie (2018) state that institutions can co-evolve with 
the introduction of technological innovations for them to diffuse through 
the economy. Chlebna & Simmie (2018) also suggest that informal 
institutions, through their impact on the behaviors of agents, influence the 
degree to which they press for formal institutional arrangements to 
coevolve with technological developments. Simultaneously, the degree of 
openness of formal and organizational institutions impacts on the ability of 
agents to foster institutional co-evolution. Martin (2008) argues that 
technological change, as an inherently socio-cultural activity, deeply 
depends on institutional setting within which it takes place. Moreover, 
informal institutions provide more fertile and less rigid environments for 
the generation of new ideas than formal and organizational institutions. In 
particular, the norms and beliefs that constitute informal institutions 
influence behaviors and the willingness of individuals, such as 
entrepreneurs consider new ideas to support change. In short, institutions 
form an important filter for the perceptions of agents with respect to 
interactions between technological trajectories and their wider 
environment. As a matter of fact, path-dependent technological trajectories 
are intertwined with their institutional settings so new path creation is also 
influenced by historical institutional arrangements and their co-evolution 
with the introduction of new technologies. Hence, co-evolving parts can 
both enable and constrain each other through feedback that can be negative 
or positive (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). In this context, Perez (2004) states that 
the deployment of each technology system involves several interconnected 
processes of change and adaptation: 1) development of surrounding 
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services (required infrastructure, specialized suppliers, distributors, 
maintenance services, etc.) 2) "cultural" adaptation to the logic of 
interconnected technologies involved (among engineers, managers, sales 
and service people, consumers, etc.); 3) setting up of institutional 
facilitators (rules and regulations, specialized training and education, etc.).  
Overall, then, the literature in this field of research is vast but it has not 
clarified the role of institutions and institutional change in technological 
innovation, such that the interactions between institutional change, based 
on process of democratization of countries, and origin and diffusion of 
technologies are hardly known (cf., Chlebna & Simmie, 2018). In particular, 
the fundamental questions in economics of innovation and institutional 
theory are: 
 What is the relationship between innovation and institutional change?  
 Does innovation depend upon institutional change of democratization in 
society?  
 What are differences between levels of innovative and economic 
performance across countries in terms of institutional change based on higher 
and/or lower democratization process?  
 Why do some societies have higher innovative outputs, fixed the level of 
institutional change and democratization?  
 How does institutional change, driven by democratization, affect the origin 
of innovative outputs, adoption and diffusion of new technologies across countries? 
This contribution confronts these questions to explain, whenever 
possible, the relationship between socio-institutional factors and elements 
of technological change, which can provide results to support 
technological, economic and social change of nations. In particular, the 
purpose is to determine if and how institutional change, based on 
democratization, affects paths of technological development across 
countries; in fact, this relation has main implications for political economy 
of growth to support institutional and innovation policies of countries that 
fertilize the economic system and underpin the technological and economic 
development in society. Studies show that institutional structure and 
political system of countries can be – through law, social rules and 
education system – driving forces for technical change in society (Coccia, 
2010, 2012, 2015, 2017a, b, c). In particular, a main relationship is between 
innovative outputs and level of institutional change directed to 
democratization of nations (Coccia, 2019). Democracy can be seen as a set 
of practices and principles that institutionalize and protect freedom (cf., 
Bobbio, 2005, 2006; Mosca, 1933; Pareto, 1946). Most scholars would agree 
that the fundamental features of a democracy include a government based 
on majority rule and the consent of governed, the existence of free and fair 
elections, the protection of minorities and respect for basic human rights 
(Norris, 2008). In fact, the Schumpeterian minimalist conception of 
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democracy is a political system based on elections1 (Schumpeter, 1942). 
Przeworski et al. (2000) consider democracy as the political system in which 
key government offices are filled through contested elections. Democracy 
presupposes equality before the law, because of political pluralism, 
whereas democratization is a process of institutional change that improves 
laws and institutions for supporting the wellbeing of people and wealth of 
nations. Several researches have showed that democracy has been 
increasing over time. In particular, Modelski & Perry III (2002) consider 
democratization as a long-run process of social innovation that has taken 
120 years to move from 10% to 50% across countries (roughly in year 2000), 
whereas 90% of institutional democratization will be achieved in the 2110s 
or thereabouts. As a matter of fact, democracy, by a Darwinian process of 
natural selection, seems to be the best political system that survives to 
social change, absorbs and supports economic and technological change. In 
addition, the proposition that wealthy society is usually also more 
democratic has a long lineage (Lipset Seymour, 1959). This hypothesis has 
been confirmed by Barro (1999), though the precise effect is sensitive to 
each time-period analyzed, to the selection of control variables specified in 
models, and to the measurement of both democracy and economic growth. 
Barro (1999, p.160) points out that “increases in various measures of the 
standard of living forecast a gradual rise in democracy”. Norris (2008) and 
other scholars argue that democratization comes together with economic 
growth (cf., Tavares & Wacziarg, 2001). Conversely, Persson & Tabellini 
(2003, 2007) claim that constitutional arrangements have the ability to 
influence economic policies and economic performance, and thus patterns 
of socio-economic development. Therefore, democracy may have effects on 
economic growth. Acemouglu et al. (2008) revisit the relationship between 
income per capita and democracy and argue that political and economic 
development paths are mainly interwoven. The economic debate has also 
examined how the institutional change of democratization can affect the 
patterns of technological innovation across countries. In particular, Coccia 
(2010) shows that new democratic laws in England and France, as well as 
the United States constitution of 1791, can be considered as the socio-
economic background of institutions and institutional change for the origin 
and diffusion of the First and Second Industrial Revolution based on major 
technological innovations (e.g., steam engine, spinning jenny, etc.) that 
changed the socio-economic structure of European and North-American 
economies, generating an exceptional increase in employment, wealth and 
economic growth of nations (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
1 “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 269). 
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Figure 1. Institutional change and new institutions, based on democratization, as 
preconditions to technological revolutions (adapted from Coccia, 2010) 
 
As a matter of fact, the civil war in England (1688), the revolution of the 
American colonies (between 1775 and 1783) and the French revolution 
(1789–1799) generated a variety of social and political forces, new 
institutions and a fruitful institutional change that reduced social and 
cultural friction  and led to the exploiting of path-breaking inventions, such 
as the steam engine supporting accelerated rates of employment and 
economic growth in Europe and North America (cf. also, Coccia, 2010, 
2018c, 2019h). Mokyr (2002) argues that the scientific revolution and the 
Enlightenment movement in Europe (from 16th to 18th Centuries) helped 
expand the epistemic base of techniques in use and created the social 
conditions for technological and economic progress. In fact, the Industrial 
Revolution requires not just new knowledge and technology but also of 
appropriate institutions that sustain the ability of society to access this 
knowledge/technology, use it, improve it, and find new applications and 
combinations for it in society. Headrick (2000) claims that the age of 
industrial revolution, through a variety of technological and institutional 
innovations, created a new political and social climate that supported more 
democratic countries. Had the institutional feedback been negative as it 
had been before 1750, technological progress would have been on the 
whole short-lived (cf., Coccia, 2018b). Yet the feedback between institutions 
and technology was and is positive (Coccia, 2010). In particular, the years 
after 1815 were more and more subjugated by the free market liberal 
ideology, which provided incentives for scientific discoveries and 
entrepreneurship within more democratic countries. Moreover, new 
democracies emerging in the late 20th Century has renewed interest in the 
relationship between democracy and economic performance (Huntington, 
1991; Kurzman, 1998). In general, liberal democracy (with effective legal 
system and political competition) can support a good economic governance 
that will translate into improved social cohesion and economic 
performance of nations (Acemoglu, 2018; cf., Farazmand & Pinkowski, 
2006; Farazmand, 2019). 
Kyriazis & Karayiannis (2011) suggest a new theoretical perspective on 
democracy as a system that facilitates changes, especially in the form of 
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direct democracy. They stress the role of the initiator, i.e., anybody who has 
the right to introduce a new proposal. Decision makers here can choose 
strategies form this set, and under a continuous process of trial and error 
can reject wrong ones and retain correct ones (in the sense of welfare 
increasing strategies). Thus, society can gain knowledge and new efficient 
institutions emerge. Taverdi et al. (2019) show that the level of democracy 
affects the quality of governance and confirm that political freedom and 
civil rights influence the level of governance with a non-linear effect. In 
fact, governance quality is typically weaker in countries with intermediate 
levels of political freedom than in their less democratic counterparts, but 
once past the threshold level, greater political competition is associated 
with stronger governance. Countries, with a consolidated process of 
democratization, experience a much higher quality of governance that is 
the background for fruitful economic, technological and social change. 
Taverdi et al. (2019) also suggest that the effectiveness of governance 
increases with economic development and education (cf., Castelló-Climent, 
2008). In short, higher economic and state freedom enhances governance. 
Nevertheless, large population, unequal distribution of income and natural 
resource abundance can reduce governance quality. Other studies by 
Kotschy & Sunde (2017) point out that excessively high levels of inequality 
erode institutional quality even in democracies, up to the point that 
democracies appear not to be able to implement good institutional 
environments if inequality is too high. To put it differently, as said, there is 
a non-linear relationship between different level of governance and 
democracy across countries. Policy implications are that effective and 
efficient democratic institutions to support a good quality governance, 
control corruption and generally allow the state to achieve its social and 
economic objectives in the long run. In short, effective institutions require a 
high level of transparency, participation and representation, which in turn 
strengthen the quality of governance. In addition, transition countries can 
overcome the problem of weak governance once the democratic 
consolidation has been achieved (cf., Lindseth, 2017; Aidt & Jensen, 2013; 
Bartlett, 1996).  
Bedock et al. (2012) argue that institutional change of advanced and 
consolidated democracies can be due to legitimacy problems, 
socioeconomic issues, technological and social development, policy 
diffusion and globalization of economies.  
This theoretical background, just described, supports the analyses and 
results of a study here on these topics. 
 
3. Methodology 
 Data and their sources 
The sample under study here is 191 countries. Sources of data 
concerning the institutional change are from the OECD (2013), the World 
Bank (2008), the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2019) and Norris 
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(2008a). Data of technological innovation outputs are taken from World 
Bank (2009) and Norris (2008a).  
 Measures 
 Institutions and institutional change 
This contribution measures the institutional change with the process of 
democratization of nations. Institutions and rules of democracies have a 
long tradition studies of political science since Aristotle and Machiavelli 
(Coccia, 2010). Modern approaches measure democracy with the quality of 
institutions and rules, such as the Freedom House Index of liberal 
democracy (for details, see Bogaards, 2007). In particular, the Freedom 
House Index of liberal democracy was launched by Raymond Gastil (1979) 
of the University of Washington in Seattle (USA). Gastil (1979) assigned 
ratings of political rights and civil liberties for 192 countries and 18 
independent territories. The index of political rights consists of 10 criteria, 
which are grouped into three parts: electoral process, political pluralism 
and participation, and government functioning. This index ranges from 1 
(best value) to 7, which is the worst value of democracy (cf., Munck & 
Verkuilen, 2002). Diamond (1986), Barro (1999), Coccia (2010) and Inglehart 
and Welzel (2005) apply this index for socioeconomic analyses.  
This study focuses on Freedom House (FH) Liberal Democracy standardized 
scale 100 pts, 2000 year per country as well as on arithmetic mean of FH 
index from 1990-1996 (using data of countries from Norris, 2008a) to 
measure institutional change based on process of democratization. The year 
and time period of these variables are antecedents to response variables, 
given by innovative outputs, because the creation of institutions and 
institutional change generates effects on socioeconomic and technological 
factors in the medium-long run.  
This study also considers other variablesto assess institutions and 
institutional change of countries (cf., Kaufmann et al., 2008; Kaufmann et al, 
1999; Norris, 2008a; Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019; Thomas, 
2010):  
 Kaufmann Voice and Accountability index in 2005 captures perceptions 
of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media (Kaufmann et al., 1999, 2005, 2008, 2010; Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, 2019). 
 Kaufmann Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 2005 
measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically motivated violence, including terrorism (Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2019; cf., Coccia, 2018d) 
 Kaufmann government regulatory quality 2005 capturing perceptions of 
the ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019) 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
 M. Coccia, JEST, 7(2), 2020, p.60-91. 
69 
69 
 Kaufmann Rule of Law 2005 capturing perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, and 
courts that also reduce the likelihood of crime and violence (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, 2019; cf., Coccia, 2017e)  
 Finally, Kaufmann Control of Corruption 2005 capturing perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019) 
 Innovative outputs, technology and examples of technological 
innovation  
The second term of the relationship, analyzed here, is technology. It has 
numerous connotations, ranging from an object to a pool of applied 
scientific knowledge. Technology is based on inventions and innovations 
(Coccia, 2019a, b, c, d; Coccia & Watts, 2020). Invention is a commercially 
promising product or service based on new science or technology. 
Innovation is the successful entry of a new science or technology-based 
product or process into a particular market. The Pythagorean concept of 
technology focuses on patent statistics (Sahal, 1981). In this case, 
technological change is conceived in terms of the number of inventions 
patented. As a matter of fact, patterns of technological innovation can be 
measured with patents, which are an indicator of innovative outputs (Steil 
et al., 2002). In fact, economic literature gives particular attention to how 
innovators can appropriate returns by patents and intellectual property 
rights, which have an increasingly important role in the innovation and 
economic performance of countries. The increasing use of patents to protect 
inventions by private and public organizations is closely connected to 
recent evolutions in innovation processes that have become increasingly 
competitive, co-operative, global and more reliant on new entrants and 
technology–based firms (Coccia, 2019a, b, c). Cohen et al., (2001) 
demonstrate that patent protection is the central means for investors to 
reap returns in some sectors, such as pharmaceutical, fine chemical 
products, agricultural chemicals, etc. In fact, a patent protects the owner of 
the invention for a limited period of time, generally 20 years (Hall, 2007). In 
addition, Chen (2008) shows a significant positive effect of patent laws on 
invention rates. In short, a vast economic literature converges towards 
patents as measures of innovation (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2005). More 
specifically, the contribution here uses patent applications of residents to 
assess innovative potential of countries and overcome the distortion that 
patent applications to patent office can be also filed by residents in other 
countries. Patent applications filed by residents are applications filed with a 
national patent office for exclusive rights to inventions  a product or 
process that provides a new way of doing something or offers a new 
technical solution to a problem. However, patents as sources of innovation 
can have some limits: for instance, transaction costs and disclosure rules 
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vary among countries. Considering this problem, the robustness of the 
analysis here based patent statistics is integrated with data of the adoption 
and diffusion of other vital technological innovations given by: internet 
users per 100 inhabitants 2007 year, personal computers per 1000 people 
2005 year, cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants 2005 
year and average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 
1995-2001 period, using data by Norris (2008a). 
 Data analysis procedure 
Firstly, variables are analyzed with descriptive statistics based on mean, 
std. deviation, skewness and kurtosis to assess normality of distribution 
and, if necessary to fix distributions of variables with a log-transformation. 
Descriptive analysis and other statistical analyses of the sample under 
study are also done categorizing the countries with (cf., Norris, 2008a): 
a) the type of democracy, given by: Free (higher level of 
democratization), Partially Free (average level of democratization) and Not 
Free (lower level of democratization). 
b) the type of economy measured with the level of Gross Domestic 
Product per capita (GDPPC) in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) 2006 year 
(World Bank, 2009): i.e., countries with High ($15,000+), Medium ($2,000-
$14,999) and Low ($2000 or less).  
This analysis can show differences between countries on how 
institutional change, based on higher levels of democratization of nations, 
affects other variables of institutional change, wealth of nations, innovative 
outputs and adoption of new technologies.  
Secondly, relationship between variables is analyzed considering a linear 
model of simple and multiple regression. The response variables of these 
models are innovative outputs and adoption of critical technological 
innovations (see previous sections). Explanatory variables are given by 
measures of institutional change and wealth of nations. Response variable 
has in general a lag of 5 years in comparison with explanatory variables to 
consider long-run effects on economic systems.  
The operationalization of the model with simple regression analysis is 
specified as follows: 
 
log yt =  + logxt+ ut        (1) 
 
 is a constant; log has base e= 2.7182818; t=time; ut= error term  
yt (response variable) is Internet users per 100 inhabitants 2007y, 
Personal computers per 1000 people 2005y, Cellular mobile telephone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants 2005y.  
xt(explanatory variable) is a measure of the Freedom House (FH) Liberal 
Democracy standardized scale 100 pts 2000. In multiple regression analysis, 
the model also considers another explanatory variable given by GDP per 
capita PPP 2005y. Note that y=year. 
Other models consider the following variables: 
yt is a given by patents of residents per million people average1995-2001 
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or cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants, average 1995-
2001 period 
xt is FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts 1990-1996 and/or 
GDP per capita PPP average 1994-2000 period 
The relationship [1] is analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression 
model. Statistical analyses are performed with the Statistics Software 
SPSS version 24. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the estimated relationship of technological variables on 
level of institutional change based on democratization. 
 
Table 1. Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change leading to 
democratization on technological variables (simple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰; y=year 
 
The regression coefficient  suggests that a 1% increase in the level of 
democratization increases: 
 the expected Internet users by 1.44% (p-value < .001). R2 value 
indicates that about 23% of the variation in Internet users can be attributed 
linearly to institutional change based on democratization  
 the expected personal computer by 1.10% (p-value < .001). R2 value 
indicates that about 13% of the variation in personal computercan be 
attributed linearly to institutional change based on democratization 
 the expected cellular mobile by 1.23% (p-value < .001). R2 value 
indicates that about 25% of the variation in cellular mobilecan be attributed 
linearly to institutional change based on democratization 
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2-3-4  
 
Explanatory variable: logFreedom House Liberal 
Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 2000y 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
Coefficient 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log Internet users per 100 
inhabitants, 2007y 
3.47*** 
(0.79) 
1.44*** 
(0.19) 
0.23 
(1.48) 
55.48 
(0.001) 
log Personal computers per 
1000 people, 2005y 
0.48*** 
(1.48) 
1.10*** 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(1.51) 
9.01 
(0.004) 
log Cellular mobile telephone 
subscribers per 100 
inhabitants, 2005y 
1.81*** 
(0.68) 
1.23*** 
(0.17) 
0.25 
(1.18) 
55.79 
(0.001) 
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Figure 2. Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
internet users across countries (log-log scale) 
 
 
Figure 3. Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
personal computer across countries (log-log scale) 
 
 
Figure 4. Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
cellular mobile telephone across countries (log-log scale) 
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Table 2. Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change, based on 
democratization, on technological variables (multiple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰; y=year 
 
Table 2 shows the estimated relationship, with multiple regression 
analysis, of technological variables on level of democratization and GDP 
per capita across countries. The first partial regression coefficient shows 
that the effect of democratization is not significant, whereas the second 
coefficient of partial regression shows that a 1% increase in the level of 
GDP per capita, fixed the level of democratization, increases: 
 the expected Internet users by 0.81% (p-value < .001). R2 value 
indicates that about 67% of the variation in Internet users can be attributed 
linearly to institutional change of democratization and GDP per capita 
 the expected personal computer by 0.91% (p-value < .001). R2 value 
indicates that about 73% of the variation in personal computercan be 
attributed linearly to institutional change of democratization and GDP per 
capita 
 the expected cellular mobile by 0.65% (p-value < .001). R2 value 
indicates that about 72% of the variation in cellular mobilecan be attributed 
linearly to institutional change of democratization and GDP per capita  
Table 3 shows that institutions and institutional change in free 
countrieswith a higher level of democratizationrather than partly and not 
free countrieswith a lower level of democratization, have a higher GDP 
per capita, adoption and diffusion of technologies under study. These 
results are underpinned with better governance indicators given by higher 
stability, higher regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
Figure 5 shows the level of variables considering the categorization of 
countries in Free (higher level of democratization), Partially Free (average 
level of democratization) and Not Free (lower level of democratization). 
Results confirm that countries with institutions and institutional change 
based on higher levels of democratization provide better indicators of 
 Explanatory variables:  
logFreedom House Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 2000y 
log GDP per capita PPP 2005y 
RESPONSE VARIABLE 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
log 
FH Liberal 
Democracy 
standardized scale 
100 pts 2000 
Coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
log 
GDP per capita 
PPP 2005 
 
 
Coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the 
Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log Internet users per 100 
inhabitants, 2007y 
4.65*** 
(0.58) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
0.81*** 
(0.05) 
0.67 
(0.93) 
172.71 
(0.001) 
log Personal computers per 1000 
people, 2005y 
1.86*** 
(0.96) 
0.26 
(0.27) 
0.91*** 
(0.08) 
0.73 
(0.85) 
72.83 
(0.001) 
log Cellular mobile telephone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 
2005y 
2.60*** 
(0.45) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
0.72 
(0.69) 
196.74 
(0.001) 
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governance, emergence, adoption and diffusion of innovation (cf., Coccia, 
1999, 2004, 2006, 2006a, 2008a, 2018e; Coccia & Wang, 2015). The logical 
sequence of these findings are in figure 6. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics based on different levels of democracy  
 Countries 
 Free Partly Free Not Free 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts 2000 90.33 10.10 53.55 15.26 26.73 9.10 
Kaufmann voice and accountability 2005 0.85 0.55 -0.48 0.41 -1.33 0.43 
Kaufmann political stability 2005 0.64 0.62 -0.65 0.76 -0.68 1.00 
Kaufmann government effectiveness 2005 0.63 0.86 -0.57 0.65 -0.80 0.71 
Kaufmann government regulatory quality 2005 0.65 0.76 -0.48 0.61 -0.91 0.82 
Kaufmann rule of law 2005 0.64 0.80 -0.59 0.66 -0.81 0.75 
Kaufmann corruption 2005 0.62 0.91 -0.57 0.62 -0.72 0.69 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%) 1975-2002  1.59 1.99 -0.08 2.65 0.51 4.40 
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%) 1990-2002 1.89 1.73 0.78 3.53 1.73 4.46 
GDP per capita PPP 2005 $11,329.38 $12,030.65 $2,252.44 $4,660.43 $3,050.43 $6,055.47 
Internet users per 100 inhabitants 2007 40.54 25.10 11.01 13.58 11.74 14.81 
Personal computers (per 1000 people) 2005  246.95 243.26 60.25 74.30 43.17 36.67 
Cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants 2005  66.19 36.02 25.69 27.22 23.82 26.47 
Note: SD= Standard deviation 
 
 
Figure 5. Clustered bars of key variables per type of democracy. Note that some variables 
are in log scale to improve the visual representation of bar graphs. 
 
 
Figure 6. Relation running from institutional change to patterns of technological 
innovation, with positive feedbacks 
 
Table 3 shows a high association between level of democratization and 
GDP per capita across countries (variability of data measured with 
standard deviation is high within sets, suggesting a high heterogeneity of 
countries). Table 4, using the categorization per type of economy, considers 
arithmetic mean of some new variables across countries, specifically: 
average FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts 1990-1996 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
 M. Coccia, JEST, 7(2), 2020, p.60-91. 
75 
75 
period, average GDP per capita PPP 1994-2000 period, average Patents of 
residents per million people 1995-2001 period, average Cellular mobile 
telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 1995-2001 period. Results 
confirm that richer countries having high GDP per capita ($15,000+) and a 
higher level of democratization, rather than poorer countries with a lower 
level of democratization, have a higher production of innovative outputs 
(measured with average patents per million people) and a higher adoption 
and diffusion of new technology of cellular mobile telephone over time.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics per type of economy, using GDP per capita in PPP 
 Countries 
 High 
($15,000+) 
Medium 
($2,000-14,999) 
Low 
($2000 or less) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
FH Liberal Democracy standardized scale 
100 pts, 1990-1996 
95.96 8.98 64.52 23.35 44.89 21.58 
GDP per capita PPP, 1994-2000 $23,484.76 $5,728.91 $6,559.06 $3,325.41 $1,256.77 $422.82 
Patents of residents per million people,  
1995-2001 
498.69 563.90 31.23 37.99 18.47 24.74 
Cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 
100 inhabitants, 1995-2001 
393.37 242.76 69.43 101.70 6.53 14.15 
Note: SD= Standard deviation 
 
Table 5 also shows the estimated relationship of technological variables 
on level of institution change measured with democratization across 
countries, using variables analyzed in table 4. The regression coefficient 
suggests that a 1% increase in the level of democratization increases: 
 the expected average patents of residents per million people by 
2.42% (p-value < .001). R2 value indicates that about 27% of the variation in 
patents can be attributed linearly to democratization  
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants by 2.74% (p-value <.001). R2 value indicates that about 37% of 
the variation in cellular mobile subscribers users can be attributed linearly 
to democratization  
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 7 and 8. 
 
Table 5. Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change, based on 
democratization, on technological variables (simple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰ 
 
Explanatory variable: 
log average FH Liberal Democracy standardized  
scale 100 pts 1990-1996 period 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
Coefficient 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log average Patents of residents per million 
people,  
1995-2001 period 
6.87*** 
(0.77) 
2.42*** 
(0.18) 
0.27 
(2.15) 
176.31 
(0.001) 
log average Cellular mobile telephone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants,  
1995-2001 period 
7.93*** 
(0.68) 
2.74*** 
(0.16) 
0.37 
(1.91) 
284.87 
(0.001) 
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Figure 7. Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
patents per residents across countries (log-log scale) 
 
 
Figure 8. Estimated relationship of institutional change, based on democratization, on 
cellular mobile telephone across countries (log-log scale) 
 
The estimated relationship with multiple regression analysis of 
technological variables on level of democratization and GDP per capita 
across countries suggests similar results (Table 6).  
As far as average patents of residents per million people (1995-2001 
period) as response variable, the first partial regression coefficient shows 
that a 1% increase in the level of democratization, fixed the level of GDP 
per capita, increases: 
 the expected average patents of residents per million people by 
0.42% (p-value < .05) 
The second partial regression coefficient shows that a 1% increase in the 
level of GDP per capita, fixed the level of democratization, increases: 
 the expected average patents of residents per million people by 
1.54% (p-value < .001) 
R2 value indicates that about 53% of the variation in patents can be 
attributed linearly to democratization and GDP per capita.  
As far as average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants (1995-2001 period) as response variable, multiple regression 
analysis shows that (Table 6): 
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a 1% increase in the level of democratization, fixed the level of GDP per 
capita, increases: 
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants by 0.54% (p-value<.001) 
whereas, a 1% increase in the level of GDP per capita, fixed the level of 
democratization, increases: 
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants by 1.69% (p-value<.001) 
R2 value indicates that about 71% of the variation in cellular mobile 
telephone subscribers can be attributed linearly to democratization and 
GDP per capita.  
 
Table 6. Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change, based on 
democratization, on technological variables (multiple regression analysis) 
Note: *** significant at 1‰; ** significant at 5% 
 
Finally, table 7 shows the estimated relationships with multiple 
regression analysis of technological variables on level of democratization 
and GDP per capita across countries, considering the type of economy 
based on three categories of GDP per capita PPP, 2006 year: i.e., High 
$15,000+, Medium $2,000-$14,999, Low $2,000 or less. Because of high 
correlation between level of democratization and GDP per capita across 
countries, the categorization in table 7 provides similar results to the 
categorization of countries in Free (higher level of democratization), 
Partially Free (average level of democratization) and Not Free (lower level of 
democratization). 
As far as average patents of residents per million people (1995-2001 
period) as response variable, the first partial regression coefficient is not 
significant, whereas the second one shows that a 1% increase in the level of 
GDP per capita, fixed the level of democratization, increases the expected 
average innovative outputs mainly in poor and richer countries (by 2.45%, 
 
Explanatory variables:  
log Freedom House Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 1990-1996 
log GDP per capita PPP, 1994-2000 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average  
FH Liberal 
Democracy 
standardized scale 
100 pts 
1990-1996 
Coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average 
GDP per 
capita PPP  
1994-2000 
 
 
Coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the 
Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log Patents of residents per 
million people  
average1995-2001 
12.13*** 
(0.69) 
0.42** 
(0.19) 
1.54*** 
(0.09) 
0.52 
(1.72) 
270.61 
(0.001) 
log Cellular mobile telephone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
average 1995-2001 
13.69*** 
(0.52) 
0.54*** 
(0.14) 
1.69*** 
(0.07) 
0.71 
(1.30) 
591.98 
(0.001) 
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p-value < .001; by 2.43%, p-value < .001, respectively), rather than countries 
with a medium income per capita. R2 value of three models has a range 
between 15-19%.  
As far as average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants (1995-2001 period) as response variable, multiple regression 
analysis shows the following results (Table 7): 
the first partial regression coefficient shows that a 1% increase in the 
level of democratization, fixed the level of GDP per capita, increases: 
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants mainly in poor countries by 0.64% (p-value<.05), whereas in 
countries with medium income per capita by 0.42% (p-value<.05). In rich 
countries the coefficient is not significant.  
The second partial regression coefficient shows that a 1% increase in the 
level of GDP per capita, fixed the level of democratization, increases: 
 the expected average cellular mobile telephone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants mainly in countries with a medium income per capita by 2.1% 
(p-value<.001), after poor countries by 1.34% (p-value<.001) and finally rich 
countries by 1.09% (p-value<.001) 
R2 value is rather low except the estimated relation of countries with 
medium income per capita where about 43% of the variation in cellular 
mobile telephone subscribers can be attributed linearly to democratization 
and GDP per capita. The lower effect of institutional change and economic 
growth on cellular mobile telephone technology in developing countries, it 
can be due to low development of system of information and 
communication networks, of its use and low technical improvements over 
time. Instead, in rich countries the lower impact can be likely explained 
with decreasing return effects of the development of information and 
communication networks. 
 
Table 7. Parametric estimates of the relationship of institutional change on technological 
variables per type of economy (multiple regression analysis) 
 Explanatory variables:  
log Freedom House Liberal Democracy standardized scale 100 pts, 1990-1996 
log GDP per capita PPP, 1994-2000 
RESPONSE VARIABLE  
Constant 
 
 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average 
FH Liberal 
Democracy 
standardized 
scale 100 pts 
1990-1996 
Coefficient 
1 
(St. Err.) 
log 
average 
GDP per 
capita PPP  
1994-2000 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
2 
(St. Err.) 
R2 adj. 
(St. Err. 
of the 
Estimate) 
F 
(sign.) 
log averagePatents of residents per 
million people average 
1995-2001 period 
 
Countries with low income per capita 
$2000 or less 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.78*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.45*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.79 
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Note: *** significant at 1‰; ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5% 
 
5. Discussion 
Considering the results just mentioned, the fundamental question is: 
How does institutional change, based on democratization, support patterns of 
technological innovation? 
Zuazu (2019) argues that the interplay between democracy and 
technological development is crucial to the economic performance of 
industries. He shows a technologically-conditioned effect of democracy. In 
particular, political system changes towards democracy are growth-
enhancing for industries close to the World Technology Frontier (WTF) but 
may have a negative effect on backward industries. In this context, a vital 
role is played by linkages between democracy, economic freedom and 
regulation (De Haan & Sturm 2000, 2003; Lundstrom 2005; Djankov et al. 
2002; Rode & Gwartney 2012). Aghion et al. (2009) show theoretically and 
empirically that democracy promotes innovation in advanced industries. 
Moreover, freedom of entry is also a determinant for sectors close to the 
WTF since, as suggested by Aghion et al. (2008), entry of new firms and 
competition spur innovation towards high levels of technological 
development but discourage innovation in backward sectors. Coccia (2010) 
shows that democratization is a driving force for technological change: 
most free countries, measured with liberal, participatory, and constitutional 
democracy indices, have a higher level of technology than less free and 
more autocratic countries. In fact, democracy richness generates a higher rate 
of technological innovation with fruitful effects for the wellbeing and 
wealth of nations (cf., Bell & Staeheli, 2001). In general, a fruitful relation 
between technology, economic growth, institutional change and democracy 
can be supported by three factors: 
(4.75) (0.43) (0.65) (2.24) (0.001) 
Countries with medium income per 
capita 
$2,000-$14,999 
9.52*** 
(1.78) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
1.25*** 
(0.23) 
0.15 
(1.68) 
22.56 
(0.001) 
Countries with high income per 
capita 
$15,000+ 
17.04*** 
(4.75) 
0.37 
(0.71) 
2.43*** 
(0.40) 
0.19 
(1.06) 
8.79 
(0.001) 
log average Cellular mobile telephone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants, 
1995-2001 period  
 
Countries with low income per capita 
$2000 or less 
 
 
 
 
11.51** 
(3.74) 
 
 
 
 
0.64* 
(0.34) 
 
 
 
 
1.34** 
(0.51) 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
(1.76) 
 
 
 
 
5.59 
(0.005) 
Countries with medium income per 
capita 
$2,000-$14,999 
16.79*** 
(1.45) 
0.42* 
(0.20) 
2.10*** 
(0.19) 
0.43 
(1.37) 
94.72 
(0.001) 
Countries with high income per 
capita 
$15,000+ 
3.13 
(3.30) 
0.47 
(0.52) 
1.09*** 
(0.29) 
0.07 
(0.78) 
6.97 
(0.001) 
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 a) economic freedom,  
b) regulation and  
c) economic and political stability, good economic governance and 
higher level of education system. 
a) The relation between democracy and economic freedom 
Studies suggest that democracy is conducive to economic freedom 
(Pitlik & Wirth, 2003; Pitlik, 2008). De Haan & Sturm (2003) show that the 
increase in economic freedom between 1975 and 1990 in developing 
countries was driven by the level of political freedom. Rode & Gwartney 
(2012) confirm these results using a panel data set covering 48 political 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy since the mid-1970s. An 
overall, positive association of economic freedom with economic growth is 
also suggested by Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu (2006). In general, studies 
seem to show that institutional change of democracy fosters economic 
growth and new technological pathways through its effect on economic 
freedom and regulation (Zuazu, 2019). 
b) The relation between democracy and regulation    
Democracy shapes the intervention of the state in the economy and 
determines the level and quality of regulation. Djankov et al. (2002, 2006) 
and Jalilian et al. (2007) show that more democratic countries and limited 
intervention of governments have lighter regulation and thus lower 
market-entry barriers (cf., Weyland, 2002). In short, democratization can 
provide higher levels of political accountability that reduce protection of 
vested interests, so that the resulting lower market-entry barriers work in 
turn in favor of sectors that are better able to adapt to new economic 
scenarios and pathways of technological change.  
c) the relation between democracy, political stability, economic 
governance and higher level of education system 
Democracy is associated with more stable political systems that provide 
benefits for higher education systems, institutions and paths of 
technological and economic change (cf., Alesina & Perotti,1996, Rodrik, 
2000; Rodrik & Wacziarg, 2005). Taverdi et al. (2019) show that the 
effectiveness of governance increases with economic development and 
education of nation (cf., Farazmand & Pinkowski, 2006; Farazmand, 2019). 
In fact, political and economic stability and the securing of property rights 
make democracies more appropriate environments for technological 
innovation than oligarchies (Acemoglu, 2008; cf., Coccia, 2016a, 2017d). 
Milner (2006) provides evidence on the crucial role of regime type in the 
diffusion of Internet. Gao et al. (2017) argue that democracy is positively 
associated with innovation in an indirect way. Zuazu (2019) claims that 
industries with a comparative advantage in new technologies are more 
likely to grow in democratic countries, since democracies are political 
systems associated with higher levels of economic freedom, investment in 
higher education systems and lower limits on market entry. By contrast, 
new investment opportunities are reduced when market-entry barriers are 
high, property rights are not properly enforced and nations have political 
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and economic instability. Finally, Dixit (2009) states that economic 
governance is the structure and functioning of the legal and social 
institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions by 
protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action 
to provide physical and organizational infrastructure. Overall, then, 
markets, economic activity and transactions function well in the presence of 
a good economic governance based on institutional change directed to 
democratization of countries. Table 3 shows a good synthesis of these 
findings for advanced and emerging economies.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Technological and institutional change cannot be discussed in isolation 
from each other. This interaction can explain economic growth and social 
change as well as wealth and wellbeing of nations (Kaiserfeld, 2015). In 
general, differences in institutional arrangements between countries can 
explain why new technological path creation takes place more easily in 
some regions than others. Evidence of the impact of institutional 
differences across nations has been provided with respect to economic 
policy within different varieties of capitalism by Hall & Soskice (2001; cf., 
Coccia, 2017, 2018f, 2019g), and with respect to national systems of 
innovation by Lundvall (1995) and Freeman & Soete (1997). At the local 
level, Gertler (2010) argues that different institutions contribute to different 
pathways of economic development in different regional settings. Chlebna 
& Simmie (2018) show that successful invention, innovation and diffusion 
of new technologies require the co-evolution of vital institutions.  
This contribution here shows a main insight: institutional change based 
on democratization is a determinant of technological and economic change, 
i.e. initially, democratization creates institutions and institutional change 
that are preconditions (factors that set the stage over the long run) to 
support paths of technological innovation and, as a consequence, of 
economic growth of nations (cf., Grossman & Helpman, 1991). Subsequently, 
the relation between institutional change and technological development is 
intertwined over time. In short, institutional change leading to higher level 
of democratization generates economic freedom, a better higher education 
system and economic governance supporting a greater production and 
adoption of technology for technical and economic change of countries. 
These results are important, very important in the modern era to sustain 
technology and economic growth in view of the accelerating globalization 
and expansion of markets (cf., Coccia, 2018f, 2019g).  
In particular, countries to achieve, sustain and improve democratization 
need bring out the value of people and to increase the education of human 
capital and, as a consequence, the accumulation of intangible capital based 
on knowledge that has a greater and greater influence on technology 
production, diffusion and on the competitive advantage of countries 
(Coccia, 2004, 2008a, 2009, 2018a, 2019e). Democracy has some drawbacks 
that may generate political and economic crisis, as showed in the course of 
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economic history, but democratic institutions have several advantages in 
comparison to other political systems because they support period of peace 
and economic stability (“Democratic Peace”) associated with technological 
progress, economic growth and wellbeing of nations (Coccia, 2019d, p. 5). 
Modelski & Perry III (2002) argue that the main advantage of democracy 
lies in its capacity to enhance cooperation and manage conflict (cf., Coccia, 
2019f). People increasingly prefer to live in democracies that are contagious 
and continuously spreading. Therefore, sustainable institutional change 
within democratic settings should be much more diffused across emerging 
market economies and improved where already applied (i.e., developed 
countries with consolidated democracy). However, the causal effect of 
democratization on technological and economic change needs to be further 
investigated considering several historical, social, economic and 
institutional factors that can affect this complex relationship.  
The findings of this chapter lead to the conclusion that policy makers 
need to be cognizant that institutional change based on democratic 
pathways sustains economic stability and a high quality of higher 
education system, which are main preconditions for the origin, diffusion 
and utilization of technology and economic growth within and between 
economic systems (cf., Coccia 2005, 2005a, 2006, 2008, 2016a, 2017d). Hence, 
political economy of growth should be designed considering the joint 
coevolution of democratic and social systems in order to support a fruitful 
institutional change and good economic governance for technical change 
directed to distribute total wealth among the widest fraction of population 
(cf., Bellah et al., 1991; Dixit, 2009; Farazmand & Pinkowski, 2006; 
Farazmand, 2019; Selznick, 1992; Wolfe, 1989). Moreover, technological 
revolution generates a disequilibrium between a socio-institutional 
framework geared to supporting the deployment of the old paradigm and 
the new techno-economic sphere brimming with change (Aglietta, 1976; 
Perez, 2004). Thus, long wave transitions are processes of creative 
destruction supporting economic, social and institutional change in 
advanced and emerging countries. These insights are important, very 
important for economists, policy makers and politicians, since they can 
propose best practices of institutional change supporting a higher 
democratization that, as proven, can foster technological progress, 
economic growth of countries, and therefore the wealth and wellbeing of 
nations (cf., Coccia, 2010).  
To conclude, the challenge for institutional scholars and economists of 
technology is to continue the theoretical and empirical exploration of this 
terra incognita of the relation of institutions and institutional change with 
pathways of technological innovation considering more and more 
interdisciplinary approaches to exploit the diversity of viewpoints that 
generate scientific breakthroughs and appropriate socio-institutional 
policies to improve human interactions directed to support a fruitful 
technological and economic development in society. 
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